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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This Court granted the State's interlocutory appeal following the district court's 
determination that under the law of the case doctrine, it was required to follow the Court 
of Appeals holding that Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial. In response to the State's 
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hawkins asserts that (1) the district court was without authority to 
perform any act except to order a new trial based upon the mandatory languC~ge of 
Idaho Appellate Rule 38 that requires once a remittitur has been issued by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, the opinion has become final and "the district court or administrative 
agency shall forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion; (2) the State is precluded 
from raising its retroactive competency claim by not addressing the issue when it was 
presented in the prior appeal; (3) because the remedy for a violation of the law is a 
necessary component to every criminal judicial decision, the Court of Appeals 
determination that Mr. Hawkins was entitled to a new trial in light of the district court's 
failure to sua sponte order a competency evaluation is law of the case; and (4) the 
district court erred in determining that Mr. Hawkins was retrospectively competent. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In its Opinion reversing Mr. Hawkins' convictions for two counts of robbery and 
remanding his case for a new trial, the Court of Appeals reiterated the facts leading up 
to and following Mr. Hawkins' trial as follows: 
On December 15, 2005, Hawkins contacted retired Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) agent George Calley and expressed concerns about 
the safety of his sons who were incarcerated in Colorado for bank robbery. 
Calley was familiar with Hawkins and told Hawkins that he could not 
protect the boys but that he could put Hawkins in contact with a current 
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agent of the FBI in Boise. Hawkins told Calley that he wanted to work with 
the FBI and that he had been working with an assistant United States 
Attorney in Portland, Oregon. The next day, December 16, 2005, Hawkins 
robbed a Key Bank in Boise by presenting a note that demanded $15,000 
and threatened to shoot people if his demands were not met or if anyone 
tried to follow him. Photos of the robber were made by a security camera 
in the bank. Following the robbery, a teller at the bank identified Hawkins 
in a photographic line-up, but police were unable to locate Hawkins. 
After hearing and seeing news reports on the bank robbery, Calley 
informed law enforcement of his conversation with Hawkins and that he 
suspected Hawkins was the perpetrator. A few days later, Hawkins left a 
message on Calley's answering machine. Essentially, Hawkins said that 
since he had not heard from Calley, he assumed that Calley could not 
help him. Calley tried to call and email Hawkins back but his attempts to 
reach Hawkins were unsuccessful. 
Several months later, on June 6, 2006, Hawkins robbed a 
Washington Mutual Bank in Boise in the same manner as he had 
done in the Key Bank robbery, by presenting a note demanding $15,000 
and threatening to shoot people. Again, a surveillance camera 
photographed the robber. As he was leaving with the money, Hawkins 
turned to the tellers and said, "By the way, my name is Faron Hawkins, 
and this is all because of George Calley." Hawkins called Calley a 
few days later and told him that he had used Calley's name in the bank 
robbery. Calley offered to help Hawkins find an attorney, but Hawkins did 
not respond to Calley's offer and terminated the conversation. 
On August 10, 2006, law enforcement located Hawkins at a 
campground near The Dalles, Oregon, where he was staying with his 
wife and children in a camp trailer. When an officer attempted to 
make contact with Hawkins at the camp trailer, Hawkins pointed a loaded 
gun at the officer. The officer retreated and, after the campground was 
evacuated, law enforcement officers surrounded the trailer and ordered 
Hawkins to come out. An eight-hour standoff ensued during which 
Hawkins fired a gun in the direction of the officers, but eventually allowed 
his wife and children to leave the trailer. Hawkins was finally taken into 
custody after the officers shot tear gas into the trailer, forcing Hawkins to 
come out. 
When interviewed by Oregon police, Hawkins stated that he 
had been a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative, had knowledge 
of transportation of weapons to Canada, had been involved in a 
South American operation with a National Security Agency (NSA) 
advisor and, at some point, had cut a transponder out of his earlobe that 
had been placed there by "someone." Hawkins also claimed to be a 
sophisticated criminal and freely admitted that he had committed the 
December 16, 2005, Boise bank robbery. A warrant to search Hawkins' 
van, pickup, and camp trailer was obtained and executed. During the 
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search, several items of clothing that matched the description of items 
used during the Boise bank robberies, together with a checkbook 
containing one of the robber's demand notes, were seized. When 
Hawkins was interviewed by an FBI agent he stated that his wife and 
stepson liked to spend money, and that his wife encouraged his stepson 
to rob banks to get more money. He also stated that he and his wife 
helped his stepson rob banks by monitoring police scanners, and that he 
had suggested to his stepson that he should rob banks by using a demand 
note. However, in subsequent interviews with the FBI agent, Hawkins 
stated that he and his stepson were forced to commit the robberies. 
Hawkins claimed that the men who forced him to rob the banks threatened 
his wife and children. He also claimed that the men put a bomb vest on 
him and threatened to detonate it if he did not rob the Key Bank, and 
again put a bomb vest on him and forced him to wear an earpiece when 
he robbed the Washington Mutual Bank. 
A grand jury indicted Hawkins on two counts of robbery. Hawkins 
moved to proceed pro se, and after an extensive Faretta inquiry, the 
district court granted Hawkins' request for self-representation but also 
appointed a public defender as standby counsel. Later, Hawkins again 
requested that counsel be reappointed and the court granted his 
request. After that appointment, Hawkins changed his mind and again 
moved to proceed pro se. The court conducted another Farreta inquiry, 
granted the motion, and appointed the public defender as standby 
counsel. On January 7, 2008, trial commenced and Hawkins testified on 
his own behalf. He admitted to the bank robberies, but claimed that 
they were done under duress. Hawkins stated that the people who 
forced him to commit the robberies did so by making threats to him, to his 
wife, and to his children. Ultimately, the jury found Hawkins guilty of the 
robberies. 
Hawkins filed a motion for new trial and then moved for 
reappointment of counsel, and the court granted this request. A few 
minutes later, Hawkins' counsel advised the court that Hawkins was 
dissatisfied with counsel's performance because counsel did not believe 
there was any basis to move for a mistrial or for a new trial. 
Hawkins requested that he be allowed to continue to pro se argue his 
motions. The district court noted that Hawkins had filed a motion to 
"dismiss on the grounds of mental incapacity" claiming that the state's 
evidence showed that he was delusional. The district court denied the 
motion to dismiss but, based on Hawkins' claim of mental incapacity, 
ordered a psychological evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
2522 for purposes of sentencing. The court also declined Hawkins' 
motion to proceed pro se, noting that "if Mr. Hawkins is contending that he 
is delusional, I don't think his decision whether to hire or not keep an 
attorney, at this point, is appropriate." 
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At a subsequent hearing, the district court set forth for the record 
that it had never had cause to believe that Hawkins lacked the mental 
capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his own 
defense. The court noted that it had ordered the psychological evaluation 
for sentencing purposes "in an abundance of caution" based on the 
assertions made by Hawkins in his motion to dismiss that had been filed 
shortly after the jury had reached its verdicts. The court further noted 
that Hawkins had failed to participate in the psychological evaluation 
and, after questioning Hawkins, the court determined that Hawkins 
was asserting his Fifth Amendment rights not to participate in such an 
evaluation. At Hawkins' request, the court ordered the public defender to 
continue to represent Hawkins and set the case over for hearing on the 
multiple post-trial motions that Hawkins had filed pro se. At the 
subsequent motion hearing, Hawkins' counsel advised Hawkins and the 
court that, if asked to argue Hawkins' post-trial motions, his position would 
be that the motions had no merit. Based on counsel's representation, the 
court permitted Hawkins to argue his motions pro se, finding once again 
that Hawkins was competent to waive counsel and that he did so freely 
and voluntarily. Following argument, the district court denied Hawkins' 
motions. 
The case proceeded to a sentencing hearing, at which 
Hawkins was represented by the public defender. The district court 
imposed concurrent unified sentences of life with thirty years fixed. 
Hawkins timely appealed. 
State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 775-777 (Ct. App. 2009) (footnotes omitted). 
On appeal, Mr. Hawkins argued that the district court erred in failing to order a 
psychiatric examination to determine Mr. Hawkins' competency to stand trial. (35281 
Appellant's Brief, pp.18-22.)1 As a remedy, Mr. Hawkins argued that he was entitled to 
a new trial because retroactive competency hearings are disfavored.2 (35281 
Appellant's Brief, p.22 (citing Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975).) In 
1 Contemporaneously with this brief, Mr. Hawkins has filed a motion asking this Court to 
take judicial notice of the briefing from Mr. Hawkins' prior direct appeal, as well as the 
State's Petition for Review and Remittitur in S.C. Docket No. 35281. For ease of 
referencing, citation to the briefing and documents from S.C. Docket No. 35281 will 
reference to the title on the document filed, as well of the docket number of the previous 
appeal. 
2 Mr. Hawkins also argued, in the alternative, that his case should be remanded for a 
determination as to whether he was competent to waive his Constitutional right to 
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response, the State argued that "the record is devoid of any evidence that would have 
raised a bona fide doubt about [Mr. Hawkins] mental capacity either to understand the 
proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense, such that the district court 
would have been required to order a competency evaluation on its own motion." (35281 
Respondent's Brief, p.13.) The State, however, never addressed Mr. Hawkins' claim 
that if there was error, the proper remedy was to vacate the conviction and remand for a 
new trial. (See 35281 Respondent's Brief, pp.1-27.) In his Reply Brief, Mr. Hawkins 
again asked that the district court vacate his convictions, leaving the State free to retry 
him if he is deemed competent. (35281 Appellant's Reply Brief, p.4 (citing Drape, 420 
U.S. at 183).) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Hawkins. See Hawkins, 148 Idaho 
at 777-783. First, the Hawkins Court held: 
Hawkins' behavior and his stories consistently raised questions as 
to whether he had a rational understanding of the proceedings against him 
even though he appeared capable of preparing and arguing his own 
defense. All of these behaviors, statements, and events should have 
raised a bona fide doubt about Hawkins' competency to stand trial and to 
conduct his own defense. Taking into account all of the indicia of bizarre 
notions demonstrated before trial started, there was enough evidence in 
this case to put the district court on notice that Hawkins' competence was 
in question. Even if the pretrial conduct was insufficient to call for a 
competency evaluation, certainly Hawkins' testimony during the trial 
presented compelling indicia that he was not in touch with reality. When 
taking the entire record into account, the district court should have 
entertained a reasonable doubt about Hawkins' mental competency either 
to stand trial or to represent himself. Therefore, the district court's failure 
to sua sponte order a mental evaluation and make a determination as to 
Hawkins' competency was an abuse of discretion. 
/d. at 782-783. Next, the Court of Appeals stated that the proper remedy was, 
"[b]ecause it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' 
counsel. Because the Court of Appeals did not have to address this issue in the appeal, 
it will not be discussed any further. (See 35281 Appellant's Brief, pp.22-26.) 
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competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and 
leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand trial." /d. at 
783. 
The State filed a Petition for Review and Brief in Support of Petition for Review 
with the Idaho Supreme Court. (See generally 35281 Petition For Review and Brief in 
Support of Petition for Review.)3 In its Brief in Support of Petition for Review, the State 
challenged the standard employed by the Court of Appeals in finding that the district 
court should have sua sponte ordered a competency evaluation, and that there was 
insufficient evidence to raise a doubt about Mr. Hawkins' competency. (35281 Brief in 
Support of Petition For Review, pp.15-27.) The State, however, again neglected to 
address or argue against the Court of Appeals' determination that Mr. Hawkins is 
entitled to a new trial. (See 35281 Brief in Support of Petition For Review, pp.1-27.) 
This Court denied the State's Petition for Review and issued the Remittitur commanding 
the district court comply with the Court of Appeals' Opinion by vacating Mr. Hawkins' 
convictions, ordering that a competency evaluation be conducted, and conducting a 
new trial in the event the district court determines that Mr. Hawkins is competent to 
stand trial. (35281 Remittitur.) 
On remand, the district court ordered competency evaluations to be conducted 
by Dr. Estess and Dr. Sombke. (R., pp.29-30, 34-35, 39-40.) In the first competency 
evaluation conducted by Dr. Sombke, he opined that while "Mr. Hawkins did show an 
adequate level of factual understanding of the court process, his ability to effectively and 
3 Contemporaneously with this brief, Mr. Hawkins has filed a motion asking this Court to 
take judicial notice of the briefing from Mr. Hawkins' prior direct appeal, as well as the 
State's Petition for Review and the Remittitur in S.C. Docket No. 35281. For ease of 
reference, citation to the briefing and documents from S.C. Docket No. 35281 will 
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appropriately interact with his attorney is extremely impaired." (R., p.164.)4 
Dr. Sombke continued, "[h]is delusional belief system is totally controlling his decisions 
regarding his court case and he is currently unable to logically and rationally participate 
in a court hearing. Furthermore, he does not appear capable of interacting with his 
attorney in a logical and rational manner at this time and he is in need of psychiatric 
treatment." (R., p.164.) Of particular note, Dr. Sombke reported that Mr. Hawkins 
completed the SIRS-2 test which "was designed to evaluate malingering and other 
forms of dissimulation." (R., p.163.) According to Dr. Sombke, "Mr. Hawkins' scores 
indicated that he was responding in a genuine manner and did not show any signs of 
malingering or feigning a mental illness." (R., p.163.) 
On October 15, 2010, Dr. Estess filed a two page "report" indicating that "there is 
no reason why Mr. Hawkins should not be able to confer with his attorney in his own 
defense and satisfy all of the other requirements that would allow him to be adjudicated 
to be competent to stand trial." (R., pp.166-167.) At the hearing on Mr. Hawkins' 
competency determination, based upon his discussions with Dr. Estess and the review 
of other material he was not provided at the time of his initial report, Dr. Sombke 
changed his mind. (11/12/10 Tr., p.20, L.22- p.29, L.2.) Dr. Sombke testified that he 
now believes that Mr. Hawkins is competent to stand trial. (11/12/10 Tr., p.29, Ls.3-20.) 
Additionally, Dr. Estess expressed his belief that Mr. Hawkins was competent to stand 
trial back in January of 2008, at the time he was initially tried in this case. (11/12/10 Tr., 
p.1 00, Ls.8-13.) 
reference to the title on the document filed, as well as the docket number of the 
previous appeal. 
4 Dr. Sombke's evaluation was signed on August 11, 2010. (R., p.165.) 
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Following the hearing, the district court determined that Mr. Hawkins was 
competent to stand trial. (R., pp.134-136.) Additionally, the district court found that it 
believed that Mr. Hawkins was competent in January of 2008, but "is constrained by the 
law of the case and is bound to follow the remittitur of the Idaho Court of Appeals." (R., 
pp.134-136.) Appointed defense counsel for Mr. Hawkins was then allowed to withdraw 
from the case after alleging that he had a conflict of interest with Mr. Hawkins. (See R., 
pp.120-124, 137-139, 236-237; 12/5/10 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-10.) Mr. Hawkins then chose to 
proceed pro se, with the district court appointing the Ada County Public Defender's 
Office as standby counsel. (12/15/10 Tr., p.6, L.8- p.8, L.16.) 
The following day, the State filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal, wherein the 
State asked the district court for permission to file an interlocutory appeal and determine 
that Mr. Hawkins was retroactively competent. (R., pp.243-252.) At the hearing on the 
State's Motion for Permission to Appeal, while acting pro se, Mr. Hawkins stated he had 
no objection to the State's request for an interlocutory appeal because "I would like to 
see another court take a look at exactly what is going on in this Court." (1/26/11 Tr., 
p.11, L.24- p.12, L.5.) On February 1, 2011, the district court entered a Memorandum 
Decision on State's Motion for Permission to Appeal and Order Granting State's Motion 
for Permission to Appeal. (R., pp.272-277.) Following this Court's grant of the State's 
request for an interlocutory appeal, the State filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.367-373.) 
8 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court correctly determine that Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial 
based upon the Court of Appeals' holding in his case? 
2. Did the district court err in making the retrospective determination that 




Mr. Hawkins Is Entitled To A New Trial In The Event The State Chooses To Retry Him 
On The Robbery Charges 
A. Introduction 
This Court granted the State's interlocutory appeal following the district court's 
determination that under the law of the case doctrine, it was required to follow the Court 
of Appeals' holding that Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial. In response to the State's 
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hawkins asserts that (1) the State waived Its current claim that Mr. 
Hawkins was competent in January of 2008 because the Attorney General's Office not 
only failed to respond to Mr. Hawkins' claim in the first appeal that a new trial was the 
appropriate remedy for the district's error, but also neglected to challenge the Court of 
Appeals' holding that "[b]ecause it is not possible to retroactively make a 
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the 
judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be 
competent to stand trial" in its Brief in Support of Petition for Review; (2) because the 
remedy for a violation of the law is a necessary component to every criminal judicial 
decision, the Court of Appeals' determination that Mr. Hawkins was entitled to a new 
trial in light of the district court's failure to sua sponte order a competency evaluation is 
law of the case; and (3) the district court was without authority to perform any act except 
to order a new trial based upon the mandatory language of Idaho Appellate Rule 38 that 
requires once a remittitur has been issued by the Idaho Supreme Court, the opinion has 
become final and "the district court or administrative agency shall forthwith comply with 
the directive of the opinion." 
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B. Mr. Hawkins Is Entitled To A New Trial In The Event The State Chooses To Retry 
Him On The Robbery Charges 
In Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court 
observed: 
"[t]he doctrine of the law of the case provides that where an appellate 
court states a principle of law in deciding a case, that rule becomes the 
law of the case and is controlling both in the lower court and on 
subsequent appeals as long as the facts are substantially the same." The 
decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a proceeding becomes 
precedent to be followed in successive stages of that same litigation. 
"[LJike stare decisis it protects against relitigation of settled issues and 
assures obedience of inferior courts to decisions of superior courts." 
/d. at 516 (citing Frazier v. Neilson & Co., 118 Idaho 104, 106 (Ct. App. 1990). More 
recently, as the State partially recognized in its Appellant's Brief, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has further articulated the "law of the case" doctrine as follows: 
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Court, in 
deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law 
necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of 
the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, 
both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." The "law of the case" 
doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged 
errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal. 5 
Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
1. Pursuant To I.A.R. 38, The District Court Only Had The Authority To Order 
A New Trial 
Idaho Appellate Rule 38 provides, in pertinent part, that: 
When the opinion filed has become ·final in accordance with this rule, the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue and file a remittitur with the district 
court or administrative agency appealed from and mail copies to all parties 
5 As addressed in more detail below, the italicized portion of the above quotation was 
not contained in either the State's Appellant's Brief to this Court, or the State's Motion 
For Acceptance Of Appeal By Permission And Statement In Support Thereof to this 
Court. Despite its omission by the State, the above quotation represents the complete 
standard for review of "law of the case" as identified by this Court in Taylor. Compare 
Appellant's Brief, p. 7 with Taylor, 146 Idaho at 709. 
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to the appeal and the presiding district court judge or chairman of the 
agency. The remittitur shall advise the district court or administrative 
agency that the opinion has become final and that the district court or 
administrative agency shall forthwith comply with the directive of the 
opinion. 
I.A.R. 38(c) (emphasis added). 
The language of this rule is mandatory - once an opinion becomes final, the 
district court is required to comply with the specific directives provided by the opinion 
rendered by either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. As such, the district 
court correctly determined that it was required to grant Mr. Hawkins a new trial. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's order finding that it was bound 
by State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774 (Ct. App. 2009) and remand this case for the new 
trial that should have occurred 22 months ago. 
2. The State Waived Any Challenge To Whether Mr. Hawkins Was 
Competent In January Of 2010 
The State is precluded from now arguing that this Court should consider whether 
Mr. Hawkins was retroactively competent in January of 2008 because the "law of the 
case" doctrine prevents a party from relitigating an issue on a subsequent appeal, when 
it had an earlier opportunity to address the same issue, but did not. 
In the instant appeal, the State argues that the Court of Appeals determination 
that a new trial was the proper remedy was not law of the case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-
11.) In making its argument, the State points this Court to its own definition for law of 
the case as "consistently articulated" by this Court as follows: 
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme 
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule 
of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the 
law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent 
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." 
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(Appellant's Brief, p.7 (quoting Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709 (2009) (citations 
omitted).) Curiously missing from the State's recitation of the "law of the case" doctrine, 
as articulated in Taylor, is the very next sentence, which states, "[t]he "law of the case" 
doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that 
might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal." Taylor, 146 at 709. 
On appeal, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a 
retroactive competency determination was not possible in this case and that a new trial 
is the appropriate remedy. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-11.) However, in making its 
argument, the State failed to disclose to this Court the complete standard for 
determining "law of the case" under Taylor in its State's Motion For Acceptance Of 
Appeal By Permission And Statement In Support Thereof to this Court. The State also 
neglected to acknowledge that the remedy granted by the Idaho Court of Appeals was 
first briefed by Mr. Hawkins in his Appellant's Brief in the first appeal, where in appellate 
counsel stated: 
The question then becomes remedy. In general, retrospective 
competency hearings are disfavored. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 
183, 95 S.Ct. 896, 909 (1975). In Drope, the Supreme Court ordered that 
the judgment be reversed leaving the state free to retry Drope. In this 
case, the same remedy is appropriate. At this point, as in Drope, it is not 
possible to make an evaluation of Mr. Hawkins' competency at the time he 
was tried. The only remedy that will fulfill the state and federal 
constitutional due process guarantees is to reverse the judgment of 
conviction leaving the state free to retry Mr. Hawkins if he is now 
competent to stand trial. 
(35281 Appellant's Brief, p.22} At that time, the State had the opportunity to respond 
to Mr. Hawkins' argument that a new trial was the appropriate remedy. However, the 
State's Respondent's Brief contains no reference to retroactive competency, or what the 
6 The attorney representing the Attorney General's Office in the instant appeal is the 
same attorney that represented the State in Supreme Court Docket No. 35281. 
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appropriate remedy would be if an error did occur. (See 35281 Respondent's Brief, 
pp.1-27.) Instead, the State limited itself to arguing that there was not any evidence 
before the district court, "such that the district court would have been required to order a 
competency evaluation on its own motion." (35281 Respondent's Brief, p.13.) Then, in 
his Reply Brief, Mr. Hawkins again asked the district court vacate his convictions, 
leaving the State free to retry him if he is deemed competent. (35281 Appellant's Reply 
Brief, p.4 (citing Drape, 420 U.S. at 183).) The State's Appellant's Brief in the instant 
appeal also does not mention this. 
Following the submission of all briefing to the Idaho Court of Appeals, the Court 
agreed with Mr. Hawkins, finding that given the evidence before the district court, it 
erred in failing to sua sponte order a competency evaluation of Mr. Hawkins. Hawkins, 
148 U.S. at 777-783. The Court of Appeals then concluded that the proper remedy was, 
"[b]ecause it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' 
competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and 
leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand triaL" /d. at 
783. It is this last statement that the State alleged to be the error committed by the 
Court of Appeals. 
Despite the fact the State apparently disagrees with this determination, the State 
fails to divulge to this Court in any of the documents filed in the instant appeal, that it 
filed a Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Hawkins. 
Additionally, in the Brief in Support of that Petition for Review, the State again, did not 
challenge the Court of Appeals finding that a retroactive competency finding is not 
possible and Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial. (See 35281 Brief in Support of 
Petition For Review, pp.1-27.) 
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Pursuant to this Court's clear holding in Taylor, because the State failed to 
challenge the alleged errors which occurred during a prior appeal, it is foreclosed from 
raising those claims in the instant appeal. The State was given two opportunities, first in 
the Court of Appeals, and then in this Court, to argue whether a new trial was the proper 
remedy for the error that occurred in Mr. Hawkins' trial. The State affirmatively failed to 
do so both times and is foreclosed from now doing so. Not only is the State seeking to 
circumvent the law, while Mr. Hawkins sits in jail, but the State has affirmatively failed to 
disclose to this Court the complete statement of the law and its own actions which, 
based on the part of the law it omitted, foreclose its current actions. 
Accordingly, because the State did not challenge the remedy given by the Court 
of Appeals in State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774 (Ct. App. 2009), it is prevented from now 
doing so under the "law of the case." 
3. The Court Of Appeals' Determination That Mr. Hawkins' Is Entitled To A 
New Trial In Light Of The District Court's Failure To Sua Sponte Order A 
Competency Evaluation Is Law Of The Case 
Regarding whether the Court of Appeals' chosen remedy for the district court's 
error was Jaw of the case, the State argues first that, 
the statement at issue was not necessary to the Court of Appeals' 
resolution of the only issue(s) it identified on appeal- i.e., "whether in the 
course of Hawkins' self-representation, the district court should have 
considered sua sponte whether Hawkins was competent to undergo trial, 
and if so, whether Hawkins was rational enough to represent himself 
rather than be represented by counsel." Whether Hawkins could or 
could not be retroactively deemed competent following a competency 
evaluation on remand had no bearing on the question actually before 
the Court of Appeals whether the trial court should have entertained a 
bona fide doubt about Hawkins' competency such that it should have 
sua sponte ordered an evaluation at the time of trial. Because the 
question of whether it is possible to make a retroactive determination of 
Hawkins' competency to stand trial in 2008 was neither necessary nor 
relevant to the Court of Appeals' determination that the trial court should 
have ordered a competency evaluation during the 2008 proceedings, 
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it does not appear under established principles of law, that the Court of 
Appeals' statement that a retroactive determination of Hawkins' 
competency "is not possible" is actually "law of the case." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9 (internal citations omitted).) 
In essence, the State is arguing that the remedy, (in this case a new trial) for any 
district court error or constitutional violation, "has no bearing" on the actual decision 
rendered by the Court. Contrary to the State's position, the remedy for an error by the 
district court or the violation of a constitutional right is a necessary component to every 
criminal judicial decision, especially in the instant case where the Court of Appeals 
vacated the convictions, rather than merely remanding the case for a competency 
evaluation leaving the convictions intact. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961 ); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (201 0). Further, law of the case is "like stare 
decisis it protects against relitigation of settled issues and assures obedience of inferior 
courts to decision of superior courts," which is exactly what the State is asking this 
Court to do, relitigate an issue that has already been decided by the Court of Appeals. 
See Swanson, 134 Idaho at 516 (citing Frazier v. Neilson & Co., 118 Idaho 104, 106 
(Ct. App. 1990). The State has already had the opportunity to challenge this issue and 
neglected to do so. The district court properly recognized that as an inferior court, it 
was required to follow the decision of the superior appellate court. 
Next, relying on Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490 (2001) (hereinafter, Stuart II), the 
State argues: 
although the Court of Appeals expressed its view, apparently based upon 
the record before it, that it is not possible to retroactively determine 
Hawkins competency when he was tried in 2008, there is no indication 
that the words chosen were actually intended by the Court to limit the trial 
court's power on remand to make its own finds regarding whether such a 
determination is possible. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
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The State's argument ignores the plain language of the opinion, the effect of the 
remedy, and the jurisdiction of the district court. Further, the instant case is 
substantially different than Stuart. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals stated, 
""[b]ecause it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' 
competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and 
leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand trial." /d. at 
783. In its conclusion, the Court stated, "we vacate the judgment of conviction and 
remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion." /d. The 
"intent" of the opinion could not be more clear, a retroactive competency determination 
"is not possible," so the Court of Appeals vacated the conviction. Certainly the State's 
argument - other than the fact the State affirmatively waived it - might have had legs if 
the Court of Appeals had not vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial, if 
Mr. Hawkins was found to be presently competent. If the Court of Appeals had intended 
to do what the State surmises, it would have simply remanded the case for a 
competence evaluation, leaving the convictions intact. 
Even if we ignore the plain language that a retroactive competence determination 
"is not possible" in this case, and we assume that the intent of the Court of Appeals was 
to remand for a retroactive competency hearing, the district court would still have no 
-
jurisdiction to re-impose the conviction without a guilty plea or finding of guilt by a jury. 
See U.S. CaNsT. amend. V. ("[nJo person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.; ID. IDAHO CaNST. ART. I,§ 13.; 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Moreover, on remand, the trial court can only "take 
actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions 
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directed by the appellate court State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886 (2000) (citing 
Walters v. lndustriallndem. Co., 130 Idaho 836,838 (1997)). 
Additionally, the State's reliance on Stuart is unavailing. In Stuart v. State, 118 
Idaho 932 (1990) (hereinafter, Stuart /), the Idaho Supreme Court had to consider 
whether Stuart raised sufficient facts in his Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
(hereinafter, Petition) that the Sheriff's Department had been recording his attorney-
client conversations to withstand a motion for summary disposition. !d. at 935. The 
Stuart I Court remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing with 
instructions for the trial court to determine: 
(1) whether there was recording of attorney-client conversations on the 
part of the Sheriff's Department; and, (2) whether the appellant's 
constitutional rights were violated. If such attorney-client conversations are 
found to have been recorded, the State will be required to show that the 
evidence at trial had an origin independent of the eavesdropping. Any 
knowledge wrongfully gained by the government cannot be used against a 
defendant 
!d. (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)). 
Eleven years later, Stuart's case was back before the Idaho Supreme Court after 
the district court determined that Stuart's constitutional rights had not been violated? 
Stuart II, 136 Idaho at 494. The trial court "applied the three exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule, holding that under the independent origin, inevitable discovery, and 
attenuated basis exceptions, the monitoring of telephone conversations did not lead to 
the discovery of witnesses." !d. On appeal, Stuart argued that based on the "law of the 
case," the trial court was limited to applying the origin independent exception. /d. at 
495. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and held that it was not error for the trial 
7 A correct statement of the law would be that the district court found that although 
Stuart's constitutional rights were violated, suppression is not appropriate remedy 
because the court applied the three exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 
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court to consider all three exceptions because "it cannot be presumed that this Court 
has decided that the inevitable discovery and attenuated basis exceptions should not be 
applied in Idaho." /d. 
In the instant case, unlike Stuart II, the language of the Court of Appeals 
amounted to an express limitation against a court being allowed to determine 
Mr. Hawkins' competence retrospectively, whereas in Stuart II, the prior opinion did not 
limit the trial court from considering other exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Hawkins, 
148 U.S. at 777-783. In addition, the discretion and authority of the trial court in this 
case is further limited by the fact the Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Hawkins' 
convictions. So even if it was permissible for the district court to attempt to determine 
Mr. Hawkins' competency in January of 2008, it would still be required to give him a new 
trial. 
Effectively, the State is attempting to relitigate an issue because it neglected to 
do so when the issue was properly in front of the appellate court and are not satisfied 
with the outcome articulated by the Idaho Court of Appeals. 8 Accordingly, as in set forth 
herein, because the remedy articulated by the Court of Appeals is necessary to its 
decision, the Court of Appeals' holding that Mr. Hawkins is entitled to a new trial upon 
being found competent. 
8 Taken to its logical conclusion, if granted relief, this Court would be encouraging every 
criminal defendant to relitigate every issue in their case, regardless of how many times 




The District Court Erred In Determining That Mr. Hawkins Was Retrospectively 
Competent Throughout His Trial In January Of 2008 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, following Mr. Hawkins' conviction on two counts of robbery, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that "[bJecause it is not possible to retroactively make a 
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the 
judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be 
competent to stand trial." Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783. The State filed a Petition for 
Review and supporting brief, which was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court. Of note, 
in its Brief in Support of Petition for Review, the State neglected to challenge the Court 
of Appeals' holding that it was "not possible" to make a retrospective determination as to 
Mr. Hawkins' competency throughout his trial in January of 2008. Following remand, 
after Mr. Hawkins was found presently competent, the district court ruled that it would 
find Mr. Hawkins to be retrospectively competent in January of 2008, but it was bound 
by "law of the case" to proceed to a new trial. Mr. Hawkins asserts that the district court 
erred in determining that Mr. Hawkins was retrospectively competent. 
B. The District Court Erred In Determining That Mr. Hawkins Was Retrospectively 
Competent Throughout His Trial In January Of 2008 
The failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to 
be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process 
right to a fair trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). In Drape, supra, the 
Supreme Court held that a state's statutory procedure for determining an accused's 
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mental capacity to stand trial is constitutionally adequate to protect a defendant's due 
process right not to be tried while legally incompetent. /d. 420 U.S. at 173. 
The applicable legal standard governing a district court's decision to conduct a 
competency evaluation is governed by I.C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211. Idaho Code§ 18-
211, which requires that when there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to 
proceed as set forth in section 18-210, Idaho Code, the court shall appoint at least one 
qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, who upon completion of an examination 
of the defendant shall submit a report to the court. The report should include an opinion 
as to the defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist 
in his own defense. I. C. § 18-21 0(5)(c). The issue of a defendant's fitness to proceed is 
determined by the trial court. 
The test for determining capacity to stand trial is whether a defendant has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding and whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the 
proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); State v. 
Lovelace, 1431daho 53 (2003); State v. Longoria, 1331daho 819,822, (Ct. App. 1999). 
1. The District Court Was Without Authority To Order A Retrospective 
Competency Evaluation 
As is set forth above in section 1(8 ), which is incorporated by reference herein, 
because the Idaho Court of Appeals determined it was "not possible to retroactively 
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" and the 
State failed to challenge that finding by the Idaho Court of Appeal, it became law of the 
case. Once the remittitur was issued, the opinion becomes 'final and the district court is 
required to comply with the specific directives provided by the opinion rendered by the 
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Court of Appeals. I.A.R. 38(c). The district court was ordered to conduct a competency 
evaluation of Mr. Hawkins to determine whether he is presently competent and if so, 
then the State would be permitted to retry Mr. Hawkins. Accordingly, this Court need 
not address the State's argument on appeal that Idaho should permit retrospective 
competency determination and that a retrospective competency determination is 
permissible in the instant case. 
2. Assuming, Arguendo, This Court Should Hold That Retrospective 
Competency Determinations More Than A Year Following The Relevant 
Proceeding Do Not Comport With Due Process 
The United States Supreme Court has never held that a retrospective 
competence determination, over a year after the trial, comports with due process. The 
first United States Supreme Court case to address the issue was Dusky, supra. In 
Dusky, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for a 
new competency hearing because of the "difficulties of retrospectively determining the 
petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago[.]" /d. 362 U.S. at 403. Next, in 
Pate, the United States Supreme Court refused to correct the violation of Pate's 
constitutional right to receive an adequate competency determination by remanding the 
case for a retrospective competency determination. /d. 383 U.S. at 386-387. The Pate 
Court reiterated "the difficulty of retrospectively determining an accused's competence 
to stand trial." /d. at 387 (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 403). The Court observed, [t]he jury 
would not be able to observe the subject of their inquiry, and expert witnesses would 
have to testify solely from information contained in the printed record. That Robinson's 
hearing would be held six years after the fact aggravates these difficulties." /d. 383 U.S. 
at 387 (1966). Most recently, in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), the United 
States Supreme Court stated, "Given the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc 
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determination under the most favorable circumstances, we cannot conclude that such a 
procedure would be adequate here." /d. 420 U.S. at 183 (internal citations omitted). 
Further complicating matters is that "[m]ental competency is not a static condition 
and is to be determined "at the time of trial'." Edwards v. State, 902 N.E. 2d 821 (Ind. 
2009). No case better represents this problem than the instant case where the State 
seeks retrial, in part because, Mr. Hawkins' retrospective competency determination 
was made 34 months after the conclusion of his trial. The State is now attempting to 
avoid a retrial because there is a "very high likelihood" that the very same issues that 
occurred during the first trial- where Mr. Hawkins will raise mental illness issues- and, 
"pursuant to the Court of Appeals' decision, this Court will be required to stop the trial 
and/or declare a mistrial and attempt to obtain yet another psychological evaluation." 
(R., pp.247-248.) 
Accordingly, in light of the problems inherent in retroactive competency 
determinations, Mr. Hawkins asks this Court to hold that the remedy for a competency 
violation be a new trial because of the "difficulties of retrospectively determining the 
petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago[.]" /d. 362 U.S. at 403. Further, all 
other determination as to whether a defendant is retrospectively competent shall be 
made on a case by case basis. 
3. Assuming Arguendo, Given The Passage Of Time Since His Trial, The 
Static Nature Of Mental Illness, And Mr. Hawkins' Actions During First 
Trial, A Retroactive Determination Of Mr. Hawkins' Competency 
Throughout His Trial Is Not Possible 
The United States Supreme Court has observed that retrospective 
determinations of a defendant's competency are disfavored because of "the inherent 
difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable 
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circumstances." Drape, 420 U.S. at 183. However, some courts have held that a 
retrospective competency determination is "permissible when a court can conduct a 
meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the defendant." 
McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 962 (1Oth Cir. 2001 ). Those courts permitting 
retroactive competence evaluation look to four factors: 
(1) [T]he passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous medical 
evidence, including medical records and prior competency determinations, 
(3) any statements by the defendant in the trial record, and (4) the 
availability of individuals and trial witnesses, both experts and non-
experts, who were in a position to interact with defendant before and 
during trial, including the trial judge, counsel for both the government and 
defendant, and jail officials. 
/d. 248 F.3d at 962-63 (citations omitted). 
Mr. Hawkins asserts that, based on the circumstance and facts presented in his 
case, a meaningful and accurate retrospective competence evaluation is not possible. 
Mr. Hawkins was convicted in January of 2008 and it was not until December of 2010, 
34 months later, that the district court rendered a decision that it believed Mr. Hawkins 
was competent at the time of his trial. As addressed above, the United States Supreme 
Court has remanded cases to the district court for a new competency hearing because 
of the "difficulties of retrospectively determining the petitioner's competency as of more 
than a year ago[.]" /d. 362 U.S. at 403. In Blunt v. United States, 389 F.2d 545 (D.C. 
Cir. 1 967), the Court remanded a case for a new competency hearing because the 
hearing was held 32 months ago, which was 10 months before the trial, citing to the 
difficulties of retrospective competence determinations. /d. at 549. See also Leonard v. 
State, 658 P.2d 785 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (remanding a case for a new competence 
evaluation just over two years after the trial, because "We feel that the difficulty of 
making a retrospective determination of Leonard's competence to stand trial requires 
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that we order a new trial proceeded by a competence determination."); People v. 
Cartagena, 92 A.D.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (holding that "Given the difficulties of 
determining, nunc pro tunc, defendant's fitness to proceed, the post conviction hearing, 
held more than one year and four months after the plea ... could not adequately protect 
defendant's due process right where defendant was not examined for competency at 
the time of the pleas and sentences."). Thus, Mr. Hawkins asserts that 34 months since 
the passage of his trial is too long for a retrospective competence evaluation, especially 
considering the static nature of mental illness. Even the district court expressed its 
concern that if Mr. Hawkins were retried, it would be required "have a psychiatrist 
present during the trial" in case Mr. Hawkins were to act out during the new trial. (R., 
pp.274-275.) Certainly, it would be extremely difficult to determine whether Mr. Hawkins 
maintained competency throughout his trial 34 months ago considering the static nature 
of mental illness. 
Accordingly, Mr. Hawkins asks this Court to remand his case back to the district 
court for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hawkins asks that this Court affirm the district court's order holding that it 
was bound by "law of the case" and remand Mr. Hawkins' case for a new trial. 
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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